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Instability at the top 
The position of National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) 
has emerged since 1998 as one of the most unstable positions 
in government. This can to a large degree t be ascribed to how 
appointments and dismissals are made. Instability at the top of 
the NPA and several acting NDPPs gives credence to claims of 
political interference. Not one NDPP has served the full term 
of ten years. Since 1998, when the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA) came into being, there have been five 
permanently appointed NDPP’s and three acting NDPPs. The 
longest serving NDPP was Bulelani Ngcuka who was in the 
position for 6 years, 1  followed by Mokothedi Mpshe in an 
acting capacity at nearly three years and Vusi Pikoli for just 
more than two and half years. Mxolisi Nxasana exited at just 
less than two years after the President established an enquiry 
to assess his fitness to hold office but which never got off the 
ground. He later resigned after a deal was struck between the 
parties. Shaun Abrahams served from June 2015 to August 
2018 and left after the Constitutional Court ruled that his 
appointment was irregular since the deal struck between then 
President Zuma and Nxasana was irregular. 2  Following the 
charging and later withdrawal of charges against the Minister 
of Finance and two others in 2016, Abrahams was instructed 
by the President to furnish reasons why he should not be 
suspended.3 Following Abrahams’s departure, Silas Ramaite, a 
Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions (who has 
previously acted as NDPP), was appointed as Acting NDPP.4 
Further instability was created by the long periods that 
persons were appointed in an acting capacity, such as Mpshe 
and Jiba. 
 
Incumbent Period Reason for departure 
Bulelani Ngcuka 1998-2004 Resigned 
Vusi Pikoli 2005–2007 Dismissed, challenged in court, settled out of court. 
Mokotedi Mpshe 2007-2009 Acting NDPP 
Menzi Simelane 2009-2012 Constitutional Court found appointment irrational. 
Nomgcobo Jiba 2012 -2013 Acting NDPP 




Incumbent Period Reason for departure 
Mxolisi Nxasana 2013-2015 Resigned 
Shaun Abrahams  2015-2018 Resigned  
Silas Ramaite 2018- Acting NDPP 
 
 
How are appointments made?  
The Constitution and the NPA Act provide that the NDPP is 
appointed by the President,5 who may also, after consultation 
with the NDPP and Minster of Justice, appoint up to four 
Deputy National Directors of Public Prosecution (DNDPP).6 The 
President similarly appoints the Provincial Directors of Public 
Prosecutions (PDPP).7 The Minister, after consultation with the 
NDDP, appoints the deputy PDPP.8 In addition, the Minister 
may ‘in respect of the Office of the National Director appoint 
one or more Deputy Directors of Public Prosecutions to 
exercise certain powers, carry out certain duties and perform 
certain functions conferred or imposed on or assigned to him 
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It is evident, then, that the entire top echelon of the NPA (at 
least 14 positions) may be appointed by the President and 
Minister of Justice without any input from other key 
stakeholders, such as Parliament, professional bodies or the 
public in general. This poses significant risks for the NPA’s 
independence and integrity. There is no requirement for a 
process calling for nominations and an assessment panel as is 
the case with the Judicial Services Commission in appointing 
judges, or Parliament in appointing the Public Protector.  
 
What are the qualification and 
experience requirements for 
the NDPP?  
The requirements for the NDPP are rather slim when 
compared to those of the Public Protector and Auditor General 
of South Africa (AGSA). In the case of the NDPP it is required 
merely that the person be fit and proper and ‘possess legal 
qualifications that would entitle him or her to practice in all 
courts in the Republic’.10 In terms of the Legal Practice Act, any 
person who has been admitted and enrolled to practise as a 
legal practitioner in terms of the Act is entitled to practice 
throughout South Africa, unless his or her name has been 
ordered to be struck off the Roll, or is subject to an order 
suspending him or her from practising. 11  There is no 
requirement of specialist knowledge or numbers of years of 
experience. Whilst it may not be possible or even desirable to 
set specific criteria in respect of qualifications, a structure 
identifying the suitable candidate would benefit from the 
advice of experts from the legal community and civil society.12 
The current relatively low threshold is particularly worrisome 
given the powerful position of the NDPP.  
 
                                                                  
1 S 193(4) Constitution. 
Taking lessons from other 
sectors 
In contemplating reform of the current process for appointing 
the NDPP, a number of guidelines can be taken from the 
appointment process of the Public Protector and the AGSA. 
First, in both instances the positions are advertised and the 
appointment made by the President on recommendation of 
the National Assembly.1 Second, candidates should reflect the 
race and gender composition of the population.13 Second, in 
addition to a candidate being a fit and proper person, it should 
be  a requirement that he or she has specialist knowledge, as 
is the case with the AGSA: ‘Specialised knowledge of, or 
experience in, auditing, state finances and public 
administration must be given due regard in appointing the 
Auditor-General.’14  
A certain minimum number of years of experience in a 
particular field may also be set as a requirement, as is the case 
with the Public Protector, who must be any of the following: 
 a judge; 
 an admitted and practising advocate or attorney with 
ten years’ experience;  
 a qualified and admitted advocate or attorney and 
have lectured law at a university with ten years’ 
experience; 
 a person with specialist knowledge of – or for a period 
of at least ten years, experience in, the administration 
of justice, public administration or public finance; 
 a member of Parliament for at least ten years; or 
 a person who has acquired any combination of 
experience listed in the above for a cumulative period 
of ten years.15 




It should be noted that the requirements for the Deputy Public 
Protector are the same, save that this position cannot be 
occupied by a judge. It is evident that the drafters of the 
Constitution wanted to weed out wholly unsuitable applicants 
for the position of Public Protector and his or her Deputy by 
requiring at least ten years’ experience in law, the 
administration of justice, public administration and/or public 
finance. There is no such specific requirement in respect of the 
NDPP. 
 
What information should the 
President consider when 
appointing the NDPP? 
In DA v President of SA16 the Constitutional Court found that 
the appointment of Menzi Simelane as NDPP was irrational in 
that the President failed to take into consideration relevant 
information emanating from the Ginwala Enquiry, in which 
negative findings were made about Simelane. 17  The Court 
found that the President must take all information into 
consideration, that the appointment process has to be 
rational, and that the President cannot cherry-pick the 
information on which he or she bases the decision to make an 
appointment. Even if the legislation itself is not particularly 
helpful in guiding the President to appoint the correct person, 
the duty rests with the President to be as thorough, rational 
and objective as he or she could possibly be.  
 
What is a ‘fit and proper 
person’? 
Given the power held by prosecutors and the discretion with 
which they are entrusted, it follows that they need to possess 
certain qualities of character to prevent the misuse of such 
power and discretion. It has been recommended that 
prosecutors ‘must act to a higher standard than a litigant in a 
civil matter’ and that the qualities required of a prosecutor are 
similar to those of a judge, and thus require a suitable 
procedure for appointment and promotion.18 
The requirement that the NDPP be a fit and proper person is 
relevant in both the appointment and dismissal of the NDPP. 
The NPA Act requires that the NDPP must possess the 
necessary legal qualifications and must ‘be a fit and proper 
person, with due regard to his or her experience, 
conscientiousness and integrity, to be entrusted with the 
responsibilities of the office concerned’. 19  Similarly, the 
President may remove an NDPP from office on the basis that 
he or she is no longer a fit and proper person.20  There is, 
however, little further guidance in law on what fit and proper 
means, an issue noted by the parliamentary Ad Hoc 
Committee that dealt with the dismissal of Adv Pikoli as 
NDPP.21 The Ginwala Commission, which investigated Pikoli, 
also paid some attention to the notion of ‘fit and proper’: 
There must be an appreciation of the significance of the 
role a prosecuting authority plays in a constitutional 
democracy, the moral authority that the prosecuting 
authority must enjoy and the public confidence that 
must repose in the decisions of such an authority.22 
With the NPA Act being rather vague about the NDPP being a 
‘fit and proper person’, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) 
placed the issue under scrutiny in 2011 when it considered the 
appointment of Menzi Simelane as NDPP in Democratic 
Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
others.23 The Court agreed with the DA’s position that: 
 Section 9(1(b) does not use the expression “in the 
President’s view” or some other similar expression 
but requires an objective assessment 
 The requirement of being fit and proper is couched in 
imperative terms, stating that the appointee “must” 
be a fit and proper person.  




 Qualities like “integrity” can be objectively assessed 
and that such an assessment of a person’s personal 
and professional life ought to reveal whether he or 
she has integrity.24 
 
The judgment lists several synonyms and antonyms for 
integrity to support the Court’s interpretation.25 The SCA went 
on to state, ‘Consistent honesty is either present in one’s 
history or not, as are conscientiousness and experience.’ The 
Court added that ‘conscientious’ is defined as ‘wishing to do 
what is right and relating to a person’s conscience’.26 On this 
point the Court concluded that there is no doubt that the 
appointment of the NDPP is not to be left to the subjective 
judgment of the President but needs to be ‘objectively 
assessed to meet the constitutional objective to preserve and 
protect the NPA and the NDPP as servants of the rule of law’.27  
When the matter of Simelane’s appointment reached the 
Constitutional Court, the Court agreed with the SCA’s 
reasoning as to what is ‘fit and proper’, and confirmed the 
objective assessment against jurisdictional facts as exist in the 
NPA Act. The Court acknowledged that while the ‘fit and 
proper’ requirement does involve a value judgment, ‘it does 
not follow from this that the decision and evaluation lies within 
the sole and subjective preserve of the President’ and is 
therefore immune from objective scrutiny.28  
The two DA decisions brought much clarity to the ‘fit and 
proper’ requirement. Identifying a ‘fit and proper’ NDPP is thus 
not a simple task and it would be appropriate that it not be 
done by one person behind closed doors. 
 
Dismissal of the NDPP 
Section 12(6)(a) of the NPA Act provides that the President can 
provisionally suspend the NDPP or a Deputy Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DDPP) pending an enquiry into his or her fitness 
told office. The President may remove him or her from office 
for: 
 misconduct,  
 on account of ill health,  
 on account of incapacity to carry our his or her duties, 
and  
 on account that he or she is no longer a fit and proper 
person.  
The reason for the suspension as well as the representations 
(from the NDPP) thereto must be communicated to Parliament 
within 14 days of the suspension. Within 30 days (or as soon 
as possible after the communique), Parliament must pass a 
resolution to endorse or dismiss the decision of the President. 
The President must also dismiss the NDPP or DDPP from office 
if an address of each of the Houses of Parliament in the same 
session asking for such dismissal is received on the grounds set 
out above. 
 
The parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee that dealt with the 
suspension and dismissal of Advocate Pikoli as NDPP observed 
that ‘it may be an anomaly that Parliament plays no role in 
appointing the NDPP, but has the final say in his or her 
removal. The review of the legislation should also consider 
whether Parliament should play any role in the appointment 
of the NDPP.’29 The review of the legislation requested by the 
Ad Hoc Committee did not happen.  
 
Noting that the NDPP serves a non-renewable term of ten 
years, but that not one NDPP has served his full term, the Pikoli 
matter was the only instance where Parliament became 
involved in the removal of the NDPP. In this instance it was a 
Joint Ad Hoc Committee with representation from both houses 
of Parliament, based on representation. The committee 
consisted of 13 members of the National Assembly (ANC 8; DA 
2; IFP 1; other parties 2) and nine members of the National 




Council of Provinces.30 To date there have been only five Joint 
Ad Hoc Committees.31 The Ad Hoc Committee had the powers 
under Rule 32 of the Joint Rules of Parliament.32  
 
As noted above, the NDPP can be removed from office based 
on four grounds, but only two of these were relevant to the Ad 
Hoc Committee’s work, namely misconduct and not being a fit 
and proper person. Two reports emerged from the Work of the 
Ad Hoc Committee, the majority report from the ANC 
supporting the President to remove Pikoli from office, and the 
minority report from the opposition parties. The majority 
report did not find, in as few words, that the NDPP made 
himself guilty of misconduct, nor did it find that he is not a fit 
and proper person. What seems to have been the most 
weighty reason is that Pikoli did not show the necessary 
sensitivity for matters of national security, an issue that 
emerged from the Ginwala Commission, but this is nowhere in 
the legislation listed as a requirement to hold office or to be 
dismissed. The Ginwala Commission did, however find Pikoli a 
fit and proper person: [Mr. Pikoli] “impressed me as a person 
on unimpeachable integrity”; 33  “impressed me as a man of 
unquestionable integrity, with passion to execute his 
constitutional responsibilities without fear, favour or 
prejudice”; 34  and again “impressed me as a person of 
unimpeachable integrity and credibility”. 35  The Ginwala 
Commission consequently recommended that Adv Pikoli be 
reinstated, but the Pikoli case raises important concerns: 
 Even though the Ginwala Commission, appointed by 
President Mbeki, recommended that Pikoli be 
reinstated, it was Mbeki’s successor Motlanthe and 
Zuma’s predecessor, that referred the matter to 
Parliament as required by section 12(6)(b) of the NPA 
Act. With the change in leadership in the ruling party, 
Pikoli found himself unprotected from political 
manipulation. 
 The Ad Hoc Committee voted along party lines and 
the majority report forwarded questionable grounds 
for the dismissal of Pikoli, but it also failed to restrict 
itself to what the NPA Act requires as grounds for 
dismissal, i.e. misconduct and not being a fit and 
proper person. 
 Moreover, the Ad Hoc Committee latched onto an 
issue (insensitivity for national security concerns) as 
the weightiest reason for Pikoli’s dismissal, an issue 
identified by the Ginwala Commission but not one 
that was an issue prior to Pikoli’s suspension, nor a 
sufficient reason for his dismissal.  
 In essence, the current procedure has shown itself to 
be extremely vulnerable to political manipulation.  
 
Why were parts of the NPA 
Act declared unconstitutional? 
Recently the Constitutional Court declared to sub-sections of 
the NPA Act dealing with the appointment and dismissal of the 
NDPP unconstitutional.36 The case concerned the departure of 
former NDPP Nxasana and the appointment of Abrahams as 
NDPP. The first is section 12(4) providing for the extension by 
the President of the term of office of the NDPP or a Deputy 
NDPP which must normally come to an end at age 65. Even 
though none of the parties were affected by this provision, the 
court heard it in the abstract. Section 12(4) empowers the 
President to extend the term of office of the NDPP (or DNDPP) 
for a period of two years or shorter periods which in the 
aggregate do not exceed two years, provided that an NDPP’s 
term of office shall not exceed 10 years. The Court found that 
this power to extend an NDPP’s term of office undermines the 
independence of the office as it may influence the incumbent’s 
behaviour and decision-making to curry favour with the 
President in order to remain in the position of NDPP. This 




affected the independence of the office of the NDPP and is 
thus unconstitutional. 
 
Section 12(6) empowers the President to suspend indefinitely 
with or without pay the NDPP. There is no time period 
attached to how long the suspension may last and continued 
remuneration is entirely at the discretion of the President. The 
Court further noted that there is no guidance in law on the 
discretion to continue remuneration and its quantum. The 
Court noted:  
This tool is susceptible to abuse.  It may be invoked to 
cow and render compliant an NDPP or Deputy NDPP.  
The prospect of not earning an income may fill many 
with dread and apprehension.  The possibility of this 
enduring indefinitely exacerbates the situation.  This is 
not a tool that should be availed to the Executive.  It has 
the potential to undermine the independence and 
integrity of the offices of NDPP and Deputy NDPP and, 
indeed, of the NPA itself.37 
 
The declaration of invalidity of section12(6) was suspended for 
18 months to enable Parliament to fix the problem and the 
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court went a step further ruling that during this period the 
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